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Elaine Craig*  An Examination of How the Canadian Military’s
 Legal System Responds to Sexual Assault
Although the Canadian military has been conducting sexual assault trials for over 
twenty years, there has been no academic study of them and no external review of 
them. This review of the military’s sexual assault cases (the first of its kind) yields 
several important findings. First, the conviction rate for the offence of sexual assault 
by courts martial is dramatically lower than the rate in Canada’s civilian criminal 
courts. The difference between acquittal rates in sexual assault cases in these two 
systems appears to be even larger. Since Operation Honour was launched in 2015 
only one soldier has been convicted of sexually assaulting a female member of the 
Canadian Armed Forces by Canada’s military legal system. (One other conviction 
was overturned on appeal and is pending before the Supreme Court of Canada.) 
In addition, plea bargains in which accused individuals can avoid Criminal Code 
convictions by pleading guilty to military specific discipline offences like drunkenness, 
conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline, and disgraceful conduct have 
been used in some cases involving aggressive sexual attacks. Sanctions for even 
these serious sexual attacks involved fines and reprimands. Last, the decisions of 
military judges in some cases suggest a critical failure to recognize the Canadian 
military’s culture of hostility to women documented in the Deschamps Report. Together 
these findings raise the following question: regardless of the outcome of the current 
constitutional challenge to courts martial proceedings in Canada (in R v Beaudry),† 
should the military’s legal system continue to maintain jurisdiction over sexual assault 
cases?
Bien que les militaires canadiens mènent des procès pour agression sexuelle depuis 
plus de vingt ans, ils n’ont fait l’objet d’aucune étude théorique et d’aucun examen 
externe. Le présent examen des cas d’agression sexuelle par des militaires (le 
premier du genre) permet de tirer plusieurs conclusions importantes. Premièrement, le 
taux de condamnation pour l’infraction d’agression sexuelle par une cour martiale est 
nettement inférieur à celui des cours criminelles civiles du Canada. La différence entre 
les taux d’acquittement dans les affaires d’agression sexuelle dans ces deux systèmes 
semble être encore plus grande. Depuis le lancement de l’Opération Honneur en 
2015, un seul soldat a été reconnu coupable d’agression sexuelle contre une femme 
membre des Forces armées canadiennes par le système judiciaire militaire canadien. 
(Une autre condamnation a été annulée en appel et est en instance devant la Cour 
suprême du Canada.) De plus, des négociations de plaidoyer permettant aux accusés 
d’éviter des condamnations en vertu du Code criminel en plaidant coupable à des 
infractions relatives à des mesures disciplinaires militaires précises comme l’ivresse, 
la conduite préjudiciable au bon ordre et à la discipline et la conduite honteuse ont 
été utilisées dans certains cas d’agressions sexuelles. Les sanctions, même pour ces 
graves agressions sexuelles, comprenaient des amendes et des réprimandes. Enfin, 
les décisions des juges militaires dans certains cas suggèrent un manque critique de 
reconnaissance de la culture d’hostilité des militaires canadiens envers les femmes 
documentées dans le rapport Deschamps. Ensemble, ces conclusions soulèvent la 
question suivante : quelle que soit l’issue de la contestation constitutionnelle en cours 
devant les cours martiales au Canada (dans R. c. Beaudry), le système juridique 
militaire devrait-il continuer d’exercer sa compétence dans les affaires d’agression 
sexuelle ?
* Associate Professor, Schulich School of Law at Dalhousie University; Research Director, 
Canadian Center for Legal Innovation in Sexual Assault Response. The author thanks Richard Devlin, 
Jocelyn Downie, and the anonymous reviewers for the Dalhousie Law Journal for comments on an 
earlier draft of this paper.
† At the time of writing the Supreme Court of Canada had heard but not released its decision in 
R v Beaudry 2018 CMAC 4.
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Introduction
In 2015 close to 1000 Regular Force members of the Canadian Armed 
Forces (CAF) experienced sexual assault, according to Statistics Canada.1 
That same year the Honourable Marie Deschamps released a report 
following an external review of the CAF’s response to sexual misconduct 
in the military. Her report concluded that an underlying sexualized culture 
exists in the CAF, which is hostile to women and conducive to sexual 
assault.2 She found that sex is used in the military to enforce power 
relationships and punish women; that fear of negative repercussions for 
one’s career progression prevents many CAF members from reporting 
incidents of sexual assault; and that there is a broadly held perception 
among people in the lower ranks of the military that those in the chain 
of command condone or ignore inappropriate sexual conduct—that 
allegations of sexual misconduct are disregarded or dismissed with little 
if any sanction for offenders.3 Researchers have similarly documented 
the perception among women in the Canadian military that allegations 
of sexual misconduct will be dealt with inadequately by the CAF, and 
1. Statistics Canada, Sexual Misconduct in the Canadian Military: 2016, by Adam Cotter (Ottawa: 
Statistics Canada, 2016), online: <www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-603-x/85-603-x2016001-eng.
htm> [perma.cc/S7B8-U5MA] [Statistics Canada, 2016]. A follow-up survey by Statistics Canada in 
2018 found similar rates of sexual assault in the military, with 1.6% (or 900) regular force members and 
2.2% (or 600) reservists reporting that they had experienced sexual assault in the previous 12 months: 
Statistics Canada, Sexual Misconduct in the Canadian Military, 2018, by Adam Cotter (Ottawa: 
Statistics Canada, 2019), online: <www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/catalogue/85-603-X2019002> 
[perma.cc/66QF-LTUL] [Statistics Canada, 2018]. 
2. Canada, Department of National Defence, External Review into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual 
Harassment in the Canadian Armed Forces, by Marie Deschamps (Ottawa: Department of National 
Defence, 2015) [Deschamps Report].
3. Ibid.
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that reporting such experiences may be damaging to one’s own military 
career.4
Deschamps’ external review was instigated by the CAF in response to 
the 2014 publication of articles in L’Actualité and Maclean’s magazines 
exposing rates of sexual assault in the Canadian military that were 
dramatically higher than those reported by the military itself.5 These media 
investigations also revealed a radical discrepancy between the number of 
sexual assaults perpetrated by members of the CAF and the number of 
charges of sexual assault prosecuted by the CAF’s military justice system.6 
In addition to the disturbing statistics they revealed, these journalists told 
the tragic stories of numerous women whose careers were ruined and lives 
unraveled not only by the sexualized violence they experienced while 
members of the CAF, but also by the way the military either negatively 
responded or failed to respond to these experiences.7 
The Canadian military can be characterized as what is sometimes 
referred to as a total institution. Erving Goffman defined a total institution 
as “a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated 
individuals…together lead an enclosed formally administered round 
of life.”8 The Deschamps Report described this characterization of the 
military in the following way: “members of the military live, work, train 
and socialize together within a closely regulated environment, largely set 
apart from the rest of society.”9 As part of this total institution, the CAF 
maintains its own two tiered justice system. The first tier involves less 
formal, summary proceedings administered by the chain of command. 
The second, or higher, tier of the military justice system involves trial by 
court martial. The military has its own judges, prosecution service and its 
own military defence lawyers. Prior to 1998, complaints related to CAF 
members that involved sexual assaults, and which occurred in Canada, 
4. See e.g. Ritu Gill & Angela Febbraro, “Experiences and Perceptions of Sexual Harassment in 
the Canadian Forces Combat Arms” (2013) 19:2 Violence Against Women 269 at 276; KD Davis & 
Virginia Thomas, “Chief land staff gender integration study: The experience of women who have 
served in the combat arms” (1998) (Personnel Research Team Sponsor Research Report 98-1) Ottawa, 
Ontario, Canada: National Defence Headquarters.
5. Noémi Mercier & Alec Castonguay, “Crimes sexuels: le cancer qui ronge l’armée canadienne,” 
L’Actualité (22 April 2014), online: <lactualite.com/societe/crimes-sexuels-le-cancer-qui-ronge-
larmee-canadienne/> [perma.cc/44H4-VXYV]; Noémi Mercier & Alec Castonguay, “Our Military’s 
Disgrace,” Maclean’s (5 May 2014), online: <www.macleans.ca/news/canada/our-militarys-
disgrace/> [perma.cc/FA9G-KWGA].
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates 
(New York: Anchor Books, 1961) at 27.
9. Deschamps Report, supra note 2 at 13.
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were normally investigated by civilian police, and all charges for such 
allegations were prosecuted before the civilian courts. This changed in 
1998 when the military was granted shared jurisdiction over the offence 
of sexual assault.10 
Like the external review conducted by Deschamps, the impetus for 
expanding the jurisdiction of the military’s legal system to include charges 
of sexual assault was a response, at least in part, to mainstream media 
coverage documenting the prolific problem of rape in the Canadian 
military.11 In 1998 Maclean’s magazine published three cover stories—
“Rape in the Military,”12 “Speaking Out on Sexual Assault in the Military,”13 
and “Of Rape and Justice”14—examining the horrific experiences of sexual 
trauma endured by women in the Canadian military. 
The issue of sexual assault in the Canadian military continues to receive 
a great deal of attention. As part of its response to the Deschamps Report, 
the CAF has adopted numerous initiatives under the mantle Operation 
Honour to address the problem of sexual misconduct in the military—not 
within its legal system specifically but more broadly in terms of cultural 
change within the organization, and support for survivors.15 In 2017, 
an 850 million dollar class action lawsuit was filed on behalf of former 
CAF members against the CAF on the basis of the Canadian military’s 
discriminatory and sexualized culture and its failure to properly respond to 
the sexual assault and sexual harassment that this culture produces. In May 
10. Bill C-25, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and to make consequential amendments to 
other Acts, 1st Sess, 36th Parl, 1998, c 35. See National Defence Act, RSC 1985, c N-5, s 70 [National 
Defence Act]. In late 2018, as a consequence of a challenge under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
which at the time of writing had been heard by the Supreme Court of Canada but not yet decided 
(R v Beaudry, 2018 CMAC 4 (Ct Martial App Ct) [Beaudry]), the military appears to have stopped 
conducting its own sexual assault trials. See R v Spriggs, 2019 CM 4002 (Ct Martial).
11. Senate of Canada, Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Evidence 
(Bill C-25), 36-1 (6 October 1998) at 15:30 (Hon Arthur Eggleton), online: <sencanada.ca/en/Content/
SEN/Committee/361/lega/34evb-e> [perma.cc/47F3-A9WW] [Testimony of Eggleton]; See also 
Colonel (ret) Michel Drapeau, “Sexual Assaults in the Canadian Military: Is the Military Making 
Headway?” (30 April 2018), online (pdf): <mdlo.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/April-30-2018-Is-
the-Cnd-Military-making-headway-002.pdf> [perma.cc/EZC4-QVY3] (testimony before the Senate 
National Security and Defence Committee citing 3 cover stories published in 1998 by Maclean’s 
magazine examining the degree of sexual violence in the military).
12. Jane O’Hara, “Rape in the Military,” Maclean’s (23 May 1998), online: https://<www.macleans.
ca/news/canada/rape-in-the-military/> [perma.cc/JTW5-RTY5].
13. Jane O’Hara, “Speaking Out on Sexual Assault in the Military,” Maclean’s (1 June 1998), online: 
https://<www.macleans.ca/facebook-instant-articles/speaking-out-on-sexual-assault-in-the-military/> 
[perma.cc/EP8R-V675].
14. Jane O’Hara, “Of Rape and Justice,” Maclean’s (14 December 1998), online: <www.macleans.
ca/news/canada/of-rape-and-justice/> [perma.cc/H4G4-YSBP].
15. See “Operation Honour,” Department of National Defence, online: <www.canada.ca/en/
department-national-defence/services/benefits-military/conflict-misconduct/operation-honour.html> 
[perma.cc/L7V3-5RQA]. 
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2018, the federal government tabled legislation (Bill C-77) that would, 
among other important changes, incorporate a Victims’ Bill of Rights into 
the military justice system. Shortly afterwards Canada’s Auditor General 
released a report identifying serious deficiencies with the military justice 
system generally in terms of inefficiencies and unnecessary delays.16 The 
military’s court martial proceedings in sexual assault cases constitutes one 
aspect of a much broader issue. Nevertheless, an examination of the legal 
response to sexualized violence by the CAF remains an important, and to 
date missing, part of understanding this issue. 
For the purposes of this study all reported military judicial decisions 
involving charges of sexual assault were examined. However, unless 
otherwise stated the findings are based on an assessment of decisions 
released between 2015 and 2018. Media focus and public dialogue on the 
issue of sexualized violence in both the military and civilian contexts have 
increased substantially since 2015.17 Several policy initiatives and legal 
reforms regarding sexual assault were adopted during this time period.18 
As noted, the Deschamps Report was released in 2015 and Operation 
Honour was launched in 2015. Increased focus on the issue combined 
with policy developments and efforts at law reform suggest that 2015 to 
2018 is an appropriate timeframe for this case study.
The remainder of this article proceeds in four parts. Part I will 
demonstrate the gap in critical examination and knowledge of court martial 
proceedings involving charges of sexual assault. Part II will show that, 
despite claims to the contrary by military officials, the rates of conviction 
for the offence of sexual assault appear to be dramatically lower in the 
military system than in the civilian legal system. Part III will examine the 
role that plea bargaining plays in sexual assault cases disposed of through 
the military legal system. Plea bargains in which accused members of the 
CAF can avoid Criminal Code convictions by pleading guilty to military 
specific disciplinary offences are widely relied upon and have even been 
16. Auditor General of Canada, Report 3—Administration of Justice in the Canadian Armed 
Forces, (Ottawa, Office of the Auditor General, 2018), online: <www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/
att__e_43049.html > [perma.cc/4H2S-9KTS] [Report 3].
17. See e.g. Dana Phillips, “Let’s Talk About Sexual Assault: Survivor Stories and the Law in 
the Jian Ghomeshi Media Discourse” (2017) 54:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 1133; Jaques Gallant, “Twitter 
conversation about unreported rape goes viral,” Toronto Star (31 October 2014), online: <www.
thestar.com/news/crime/2014/10/31/twitter_conversation_about_unreported_rape_goes_global.
html> [perma.cc/M2C5-N8C3]; Simon Houpt, “Jury’s still out on media’s role in Ghomeshi case,” 
Globe and Mail (25 March 2016), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/jury-still-out-
on-medias-role-in-ghomeshi-case/article29397973/> [perma.cc/7NDG-F5DN].
18. See e.g. Ontario, It’s Never Okay: An Action Plan to Stop Sexual Violence and Harassment 
(Ontario: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2015), online (pdf): <dr6j45jk9xcmk.cloudfront.net/
documents/4593/actionplan-itsneverokay.pdf> [perma.cc/DZL5-RW9N]. 
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used in cases involving aggressive sexual attacks. Part IV will consider 
reported cases involving charges of sexual assault that have been tried 
by courts martial, the majority of which, since 2015, have resulted in 
acquittals. The concluding section of the article will identify unanswered 
questions and issues that require further research.
I. The CAF’s sexual assault  cases have not been studied
While academic research studying sexual assault in the civilian legal system 
is robust,19 there has been no legal scholarship examining the prosecution 
of sexual assault by the Canadian military’s legal system. For decades legal 
scholars have published detailed, in depth examinations of the civilian body 
of caselaw interpreting and applying the law of sexual assault in Canada.20 
In contrast, there have been no published studies providing analysis and 
critique of the sexual assault caselaw produced by Canada’s military 
courts. Nor have any of the numerous external reviews of the military’s 
legal system focussed on its sexual assault cases.21 When confronted 
19. See e.g. Constance Backhouse, Carnal Crimes (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008); Lise Gotell, 
“When Privacy Is Not Enough: Sexual Assault Complainants, Sexual History Evidence and the 
Disclosure of Personal Records” (2006) 43:3 Alta L Rev 743; Melanie Randall, “Sexual Assault Law, 
Credibility, and ‘Ideal Victims’: Consent, Resistance, and Victim Blaming” (2010) 22:2 CJWL 397; 
David Tanovich, “‘Whack No More’: Infusing Equality into the Ethics of Defence Lawyering in 
Sexual Assault Cases” (2015) 45:3 Ottawa L Rev 495; Karen Busby, “Discriminatory Uses of Personal 
Records in Sexual Violence Cases” (1996) 9:1 CJWL 148; Christine Boyle, Sexual Assault (Toronto: 
Carswell, 1984).
20. Ibid.
21. An external review of military justice and the military police was completed in 1997: Canada, 
Department of National Defence, Report of the Special Advisory Group on Military Justice and Military 
Police Investigation Services, (March 1997) (Chair: The Right Honourable Brian Dickson), online 
(pdf): <responsesystemspanel.whs.mil/public/docs/meetings/20130924/materials/allied-forces-mil-
justice/canada-mj-sys/04_Dickson_Rpt.pdf > [perma.cc/L2VL-L8XJ]. Following the federal inquiry 
into the misconduct of the Canadian Forces in Somalia (Canada, Department of National Defence, 
Dishonoured	Legacy:	 the	Lessons	of	 the	Somalia	Affair:	Report	of	 the	Commission	of	Inquiry	 into	
the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing, 1997)), 
online: <publications.gc.ca/site/eng/9.700365/publication.html> [perma.cc/FS63-626V]) legislation 
was passed in 1997 mandating an external review of the courts martial system every five years. 
Two such reviews have been undertaken: Canada, Department of National Defence, Report of the 
First Independent Review by the Right Honourable Antonio Lamer of the provisions and operation 
of Bill C-25 An Act to amend the National Defence Act and to make consequential amendments to 
other Acts, as required under section 96 of Statutes of Canada 1998, c 35 (Ottawa: Department of 
National Defence, September 2003); Canada, Department of National Defence, Report of the Second 
Independent Review Authority to The Honourable Peter G MacKay, Minister of National Defence, 
by The Honourable Patrick J LeSage (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2011). In addition 
in 2008 and 2009 the Bronson Consulting Group was commissioned by the Director of Military 
Prosecutions and the Director of Defence Counsel Services respectively to conduct an external review 
of the way in which military prosecutions and defence services were conducted (See Andrejs Berzins 
& Malcolm Lindsay, External Review of the Canadian Military Prosecution Service (Ottawa: Bronson 
Consulting Group, 2008); Andrejs Berzins & Malcolm Lindsay, External Review of Defence Counsel 
Services (Ottawa: Bronson Consulting Group, 2009). None of these reviews examined sexual assault 
proceedings specifically. 
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with the statistics and allegations gathered in 2014 by journalists from 
L’Actualité and Maclean’s, then Director of the Military Justice Strategic 
Response Team, Lieutenant Colonel André Dufour, reportedly stated “I 
think we have a good system in place that gets results.”22 To support his 
assertion, Dufour pointed to three independent reviews of the military 
justice system conducted in 1997, 2003, and 2011: “There’s nothing in 
these reports about sexual assaults, and no indication there’s anything 
wrong with the system.”23 It is true that none of the three former judges 
(Brian Dickson, Antonio Lamer and Patrick LeSage) who conducted these 
reviews made any mention of sexual assault in their reports. It is equally 
true that these reports provide no indication that the reviewers specifically 
considered the issue of sexualized violence in the Canadian military. This 
omission is most significant with respect to the latter two reviews, which 
were conducted after the military had been granted shared jurisdiction 
over sexual offences.  There is no indication in either the 2003 Lamer 
Report or the 2011 LeSage Report that, in assessing the military’s legal 
system, these reviewers turned their minds to the conduct and adjudication 
of sexual assault trials by the Canadian military. In other words, although 
these reviews were conducted during an era in which, for the first time, 
sexual assault trials had become a significant proportion of the courts 
martial caseload, and despite the features which make sexual assault 
different from other types of offences, their reports made no mention of 
these proceedings or how the military was handling them. These features 
would include the legacy of discriminatory stereotypes that infused sexual 
assault law, different evidentiary considerations (such as rules related to 
the introduction of evidence of other sexual activity), and the relationship 
between law and the social context which gives rise to such high rates of 
sexualized violence and low rates of reporting.24 
The mandate of Madame Deschamps’ 2015 review was to consider 
and make recommendations regarding the adequacy of the military’s 
“policies, procedures and programs in relation to sexual misconduct and 
sexual harassment.”25 Yet even this purportedly comprehensive assessment 
of the CAF’s response to sexualized violence was explicitly directed not 
to consider the military’s legal system. Limitations placed on the scope 
of Deschamps’ review included that she “shall not review” any decision 
of a court martial or summary trial, any decision of a military judge, any 
22. Mercier & Castonguay, supra note 5.
23. Ibid.
24. See Boyle, supra note 19; Elizabeth Sheehy, ed, Sexual Assault in Canada: Law, Legal Practice, 
and Women’s Activism (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2012).
25. Deschamps Report, supra note 2 at 4.
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decision with respect to the laying or prosecuting of charges, and “any 
matter related to the JAG [Judge Advocate General] in respect of his 
superintendence of the administration of military justice in the CAF.”26 
As such, her report made “no comment with respect to court martial or 
summary trials.”27 In describing the objectives of and purpose for ordering 
the Deschamps Report then Chief of Defence Staff General Tom Lawson 
stated: 
I want to understand the full scope of any problems, and I want to 
resolve them, so I’ve called for engagement on this issue at every level 
of the organization….I’ve ordered an internal review of our workplace 
programs and policies, and I have committed now to conducting an 
external, independent review into how the Canadian Armed Forces deals 
with issues related to sexual misconduct and sexual harassment.
As findings emerge from these reviews, I’ll consider all options to 
resolve any problems that we identify, including making improvements to 
Canadian Armed Forces policies, procedures, programs, and education. 
(emphasis added)28
Given such a breadth of inquiry and objectives, it is difficult to understand 
the justification for excluding the CAF’s legal system from the scope of 
this review of the Canadian military’s response to sexual misconduct.29 
Indeed, even without such an explicitly broad articulation of its objectives 
it would be difficult to understand how one could adequately review the 
military’s response to sexual misconduct, including sexual assault, without 
considering its legal system. When asked about the limited scope of her 
mandate, Madame Deschamps said: “[t]here is a review process that is 
provided by the statute of the military justice system. There is a report that 
was handed to me in the fall of 2014, the LeSage report. I understood my 
mandate as looking at what goes on upstream.”30 The statutory reviews she 
26. Ibid at 5.
27. Ibid at 67.
28. House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence, Evidence, 41-2, No 27 (27 May 
2014) at 11:00 (General Tom Lawson), online: <www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/41-2/
NDDN/meeting-27/evidence> [perma.cc/EJT6-XE7F] [Testimony of Lawson].
29. Deschamps’ review was ordered by the Chief of Defence Staff General Tom Lawson. In an effort 
to ensure independence, the Judge Advocate General (who oversees the administration of military 
justice) reports to the Minister of Defence rather than the Chief of Defence Staff. However, it seems 
implausible to accept that the military’s legal system was explicitly excluded from the mandate of this 
review simply because of this reporting structure. Presumably the external review could have been 
ordered by the Minister of Defence or jointly authorized by the Chief of Defence Staff and the Minister 
of Defence. 
30. House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence, Evidence, 41-2, No 60 (25 May 
2015) at 15:35 (Hon Marie Deschamps), online: <www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/41-2/
NDDN/meeting-60/evidence> [perma.cc/DWT4-X9JR].
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was referring to were the ones done by former Justices Dickson, Lamer, 
and most recently, LeSage. As already noted, none of these reviews 
appear to have devoted any specific consideration to the military legal 
system’s response to sexual assault. Given its particularity as an offence31 
and its endemic rates in the military context, the failure to address sexual 
assault in these reports suggests a significant deficiency in these statutorily 
mandated reviews. Pointing to these reports to justify the limitations placed 
on Deschamps’s review of the military’s response to sexual misconduct 
is not a compelling explanation for excluding the military’s legal system 
from the scope of her mandate. 
To date the only reported review of the military’s legal system that 
has specifically considered its conduct of sexual assault cases was a 
comprehensive internal review of the courts martial system ordered by the 
Judge Advocate General (JAG) in 2016. While the mandate for this review 
was not focussed on sexual assault, as part of its work the Review Team 
consulted with, and reported on its consultations with, military sexual 
trauma survivors.32 In addition to highlighting possible weaknesses with 
the courts martial system generally, the Review Team’s draft interim report 
concluded that victims of military sexual trauma do not have the same 
rights and protections as civilian complainants and that the effectiveness 
and legitimacy of the courts martial system would increase if these victims 
had rights and access to resources at least equal to those available in the 
civilian system.33 There is some evidence to suggest that the military 
initially attempted to conceal this interim report.34 
When the interim report was released publicly in January, 2018 the 
JAG announced that no further work would be done by the Review Team 
in light of forthcoming external reviews. She recharacterized the report 
as a “discussion paper” and asserted that it represented the views of its 
authors, not those of the JAG or the Office of the JAG.35 The external 
reviews she was referring to were the 2018 Auditor General’s report 
31. Sheehy, supra note 24. 
32. The Review Team filed a draft interim report with the JAG on July 21, 2017. Department of 
National Defence, Court Martial Comprehensive Review—Interim Report, by The Court Martial 
Comprehensive Review Team (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 17 January 2008), online 
(pdf): <www.canada.ca/content/dam/dnd-mdn/migration/assets/FORCES_Internet/docs/en/jag/court-
martial-comprehensive-review-interim-report-21july2017.pdf> [perma.cc/6DLD-Y988] [CMCR 
Draft].
33. Ibid at 222.
34. See David Pugliese, “Canadian military claimed a report didn’t exist—even though it ‘clearly’ 
did,” National Post (16 January 2019), online: <nationalpost.com/news/canadian-military-claimed-a-
report-didnt-exist-even-though-it-did> [perma.cc/8GCQ-WSM7].
35. CMCR Draft, supra note 32 at 3 (cover letter by Judge Advocate General Commodore Geneviève 
Bernatchez).
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which was released in the spring of 2018 and the next statutorily mandated 
review under the National Defence Act, which has yet to be commenced.36 
The Auditor General reported several deficiencies with the current courts 
martial system, primarily related to inefficiencies and delay.37 His report 
did not direct specific attention to the military’s conduct of sexual assault 
cases. He also excluded from its consideration the overall strategy and 
approach to deal with inappropriate sexual behaviour in the Canadian 
Armed Force. This was the subject of a second 2018 report which, like 
Deschamps’ review, focussed on the issue of sexual misconduct in the 
military but did not consider the courts martial system’s sexual assault 
cases.38
Simply put, while the prevalence and consequences of sexual assault 
in the Canadian military are profound and the CAF has been conducting 
sexual assault trials for over twenty years, from an academic perspective 
very little is known about them. This raises the obvious question: what does 
an analysis of the military justice system’s sexual assault cases reveal? As 
will be explained in the sections to follow, a closer look at the sexual 
assault cases disposed of by the courts martial system in recent years 
yields three important findings: i) despite claims suggesting otherwise, the 
military’s conviction rate for sexual assault appears to be strikingly lower 
than civilian conviction rates; ii) plea bargaining in sexual assault cases 
dispensed with through the courts martial process almost never results in 
a Criminal Code conviction or serious penalty for the accused; and iii) in 
those reported cases which do proceed to trial the rate of acquittal appears 
to be higher than in the civilian system and the reasons for decision in some 
cases suggest a problematic failure on the part of some military judges to 
properly account for the context in which military sexual trauma arises.
II. Military convictions for sexual assault appear to be strikingly low 
and acquittal rates at trial remarkably high
Following the 2014 revelations in Maclean’s, top military officials were 
called before the Standing Senate Committee on National Defence to 
discuss the issue of sexualized violence in the CAF.39 In their testimony 
these officials made certain claims about the military’s legal system and 
its response to allegations of sexualized violence. Then Chief of Defence 
Staff General Tom Lawson testified that “there is evidence, both among 
36. Report 3, supra note 16.
37. Ibid.
38. Auditor General of Canada, Report 5—Inappropriate Sexual Behaviour—Canadian Armed 
Forces (Ottawa: Office of the Auditor General, 20 November 2018), online: <www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/
internet/English/parl_oag_201811_05_e_43203.html> [perma.cc/48L4-L8H6].
39. Testimony of Lawson, supra note 28. 
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our neighbours to the south and in Canada, that military justice prosecutes 
these [sexual misconduct] allegations more aggressively than parallel 
civilian justice systems.”40 
When asked what assurances he could give even the “lowest ranking” 
person who comes forward with a complaint that “it would be taken 
seriously and with the full force of the law,” former Judge Advocate 
General Major-General Blaise Cathcart testified: 
I can give full assurance, as a superintendent of the administration of the 
military justice system, that our system is the equal and, in some cases, 
better in terms of resource availability for both victims and accused than 
the civilian side. 
Our standards and the way in which the investigators work, and the 
police, the judges, are exactly the same as a civilian court would be 
using.41
Speaking about the military legal system more generally, in a pre-
retirement interview he provided on 7 May 2017, Major-General Cathcart 
stated: “In many ways I would say it’s certainly the equal—and in some 
cases objectively better—than the civilian justice system.”42
In testimony before the Standing Senate Committee on National 
Security and Defence on June 11, 2018, current Chief of Defence Staff 
General Jonathan Vance asserted that the overall conviction rate for sexual 
misconduct has been 87 per cent since the start of Operation Honour 
(which was launched in 2015 in response to the alarming findings in the 
Deschamps Report).43 He testified that “this puts our conviction rates 
higher than any other civilian justice system for both sexual assault and 
lesser offences, speaking to both the effectiveness and necessity of our 
military justice system.”44
These claims raise important questions regarding the Canadian 
military’s sexual assault cases. Is the military’s legal system prosecuting 
40. Ibid at 11:40 (He did not provide a source or citation for this evidence). 
41. House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence, Evidence, 41-2, No 27 (27 May 
2014) at 11:45 (General Blaise Cathcart), online: <www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/41-2/
NDDN/meeting-27/evidence> [perma.cc/FQ2K-UQ5J] [Testimony of Cathcart].
42. Cristin Schmitz, “Canada’s Outgoing Judge Advocate General Fires Back at Critics,” Lawyer’s 
Daily (7 May 2017), online: <www.thelawyersdaily.ca/articles/3115> [perma.cc/55G7-YQC6].
43. Senate of Canada, Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Evidence, 
41-1, No 29 (11 June 2018), at 13:34 (General Jonathan Vance), online: <sencanada.ca/en/Content/
SEN/Committee/421/secd/29ev-54156-e> [perma.cc/6QHZ-T3Q9] [Testimony of Vance]; See also 
Miranda Brumwell, “Gen. Jonathan Vance Discusses SMRC and Operation Honour”, Canadian 
Military Family Magazine (18 June 2018), online: <www.cmfmag.ca/duty_calls/gen-jonathan-vance-
discusses-the-smrc-and-operation-honour/> [perma.cc/F8VC-LULJ].
44. Ibid.
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and adjudicating sexual assault cases in a manner that is comparable (or in 
some sense superior) to the civilian criminal legal system? If the military’s 
legal system is comparable or superior to the civilian one in terms of 
responding to allegations of sexual assault, what explains the widely held 
perception among non-commissioned members of the Canadian military 
that sexual misconduct will not be appropriately addressed by the CAF?45
A preliminary approach to resolving these questions requires an 
examination of the sexual assault cases that have been adjudicated 
by military courts in Canada. In other words, it is useful to consider 
these officials’ claims concerning the military’s legal system in light of 
Canadian courts martial caselaw. Of particular relevance is the military’s 
sexual assault caselaw between 2015 (when the Deschamps Report was 
released and Operation Honour was launched) and 2018 (when the military 
temporarily stopped prosecuting sexual offences pending the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s decision in R v Beaudry on the constitutionality of the 
courts martial process). Unless otherwise indicated, the findings described 
in this study are based on military judicial decisions involving charges of 
sexual assault that were released between 2015 and 2018.
Does the caselaw indicate that our military justice system prosecutes 
allegations of sexual assault “aggressively” (accepting that it is unclear 
what this means), as suggested by General Lawson?46 Is it accurate to assert 
that conviction rates for “both sexual assault and lesser offences are higher 
[in the military’s legal system] than in any other civilian justice system,” 
as stated by General Vance?47 In fact, based on a review of the military’s 
reported judicial decisions between 2015 and 2018, the Canadian military 
justice system secured a conviction for the offence of sexual assault itself 
(rather than sexual misconduct more broadly) in only four cases—an 
average of one sexual assault conviction per year.48 
Conviction rates refer to convictions that arise either because of a 
guilty plea or because of a finding of guilt at trial. The conviction rate for 
the offence of sexual assault disposed of through court martial proceedings 
in Canada (either by plea bargain or trial) over this four-year period was 
45. Deschamps Report, supra note 2; Gill & Febbraro, supra note 4.
46. Testimony of Lawson, supra note 28.
47. Testimony of Vance, supra note 43.
48. The Office of the Chief Military Judge maintains a digital database in which courts martial 
decisions are published (online: <decisia.jmc-cmj.forces.gc.ca/jmc-cmj/en/nav.do> [perma.cc/EW78-
DYBN]). Sexual assault decisions prior to 2009 are generally not available in this database. For 
the purposes of this study all reported cases involving sexual assault charges have been reviewed. 
Findings with respect to conviction rates, plea bargains and sentencing, unless otherwise indicated, are 
based on cases released between 1 January 2015 and 31 December 2018. There were four convictions 
for the offence of sexual assault during this period.
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approximately 14 per cent.49 If convictions for lesser included Criminal 
Code offences such as assault are included, the conviction rate during this 
period was approximately 28 per cent.50 These figures are markedly lower 
than the conviction rate in cases disposed of in Canada’s civilian criminal 
court system. For example, the conviction rate for sexual assault and lesser 
included offences disposed of in Canada’s civilian criminal courts during 
this same time period was between approximately 42 and 55 per cent.51 
The discrepancy between acquittal rates in the two systems for those 
cases that go to trial is also marked. An acquittal rate refers to the number 
of cases in which, following a trial, the accused was acquitted of all 
charges presented to the court. The acquittal rate in sexual assault cases 
in Canada’s civilian system of cases that went to court is approximately 
8 to 10 per cent.52 In Canada’s military legal system the acquittal rate in 
reported sexual assault cases that went to court either for a guilty plea or 
trial between 2015 and 2018 was approximately 31 per cent.53 Since the 
49. There were 29 reported cases disposing of sexual assault charges during this four year period. 
There were nine reported cases disposing of charges of sexual assault in 2018 (and two further cases 
in which charges were withdrawn pending the outcome of the appeal in Beaudry, supra note 10), nine 
in 2017, six in 2016 and five in 2015. In four of these 29 cases the accused either pled guilty to sexual 
assault (R v W(TS), 2018 CM 2004 (Ct Martial) [W(TS)]) or was convicted at trial (R v Cooper, 2018 
CM 2013 (Ct Martial) [Cooper]; R v Wilks, 2017 CM 1008 (Ct Martial) [Wilks]; Beaudry, supra note 
10), resulting in a conviction rate of 4/29 or approximately 14% for the offence of sexual assault. 
50. There were three convictions for the lesser included offence of assault (R v Gobin, 2018 CM 2007 
(Ct Martial) [Gobin]; R v Laferrière, 2016 CM 3016 (Ct Martial) [Laferrière]; R v Scott, 2015 CM 
1005 (Ct Martial) [Scott]). In one case the accused was acquitted of sexual assault but pled guilty to 
criminal harassment (R v Ryan, 2018 CM 2033 (Ct Martial) [Ryan]). If convictions for lesser included 
Criminal Code offences are included in the calculation of the military’s conviction rate during this four 
year period the conviction rate was approximately 28% or 8/29 (four convictions for sexual assault 
and four convictions for these lesser included offences.) In one further case, seemingly in response to 
Beaudry, supra note 10, the prosecution withdrew four charges of sexual assault and instead proceeded 
with four charges of conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline (R v Taylor, 2018 CM 
2029 (Ct Martial)). In Ryan, ibid the military judge determined that a trial date would be set after 
an interlocutory decision in Beaudry to determine whether to suspend the declaration of invalidity 
regarding the constitutionality of courts martial proceedings in cases where an accused would, in a 
civilian context, have a right to a jury trial.
51. Statistics Canada, Adult Criminal Courts, number of cases and charges by type of decision 
(Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2019), online: <www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=351000
2701&pickMembers%5B0%5D=1.1&pickMembers%5B1%5D=2.8&pickMembers%5B2%5D=3.1
&pickMembers%5B3%5D=4.1&pickMembers%5B4%5D=5.2> [perma.cc/DL67-W995] [Statistics 
Canada, 2019] (Note that this figure includes convictions for included offences and so would be 
lower if one excluded these convictions). The conviction rate for sexual assault cases that proceeded 
to Canada’s civilian courts between 2009 and 2014 was 55%: Statistics Canada, From arrest to 
conviction: Court outcomes of police-reported sexual assaults in Canada, 2009 to 2014 (Ottawa: 
Statistics Canada, 26 October 2017), online: <www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-002-x/2017001/
article/54870-eng.htm> [perma.cc/HDR5-XG6H] [Statistics Canada, 2017].
52. Statistics Canada, 2019, supra note 51.
53. Between 2015 and 2018 there were 29 reported cases disposed of by courts martial. Fourteen of 
those went to trial of which nine were acquitted of all charges for an acquittal rate of 31% for all sexual 
assault cases disposed of through court martial and 64% of those that went to trial. Between 2010 
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launch of Operation Honour in 2015, 9 of the military’s 14 sexual assault 
trials have resulted in acquittals on all charges.54 While the disparity 
between these acquittal rates does not reveal the full picture in terms of 
case outcomes, because it does not account for differences in the rates at 
which sexual assault cases disposed of in court in the two systems end with 
stays, dismissals, and withdrawals, the discrepancy between the number of 
trials that result in acquittals in the two systems is striking.
Moreover and as will be explained further below, since 2015 (the year 
Operation Honour was launched) courts martial proceedings have resulted 
in a conviction for sexual assault in only two cases—R v Beaudry55 and R v 
Wilks56—of what might be described as a ‘typical’ sexual assault allegation 
in which the complainant was a woman. (The conviction in Beaudry was 
overturned by the Court Martial Appeals Court on the basis of a Charter 
challenge which is now pending before the Supreme Court of Canada.57 
Wilks involved a medical technician who was convicted of sexual assault 
for groping several women during physical exams.58) As noted, there were 
only two other convictions for the offence of sexual assault during this 
four year period: one involving a CAF member who pled guilty to sexual 
assault for molesting his 12 year old step daughter (after sexually explicit 
pictures of her were inadvertently found on his computer by military 
police)59; and one involving a gay male sailor who was convicted of 
performing non-consensual fellatio on a heterosexual male shipmate with 
whom he had been drinking.60 
There is, of course, no such thing as a ‘typical’ sexual assault. The 
term is being used here to connote cases involving allegations of non-
and 2018 there were 56 reported court martial cases involving sexual assault charges. There were 29 
trials. In 14 of these trials the accused was acquitted of all charges: R v Nordstrom, 2018 CM 4011 (Ct 
Martial) [Nordstrom]; R v MacIntyre, 2018 CM 4014 (Ct Martial) [MacIntyre] (acquitted by a General 
Courts Martial); R v Obele Ngoudni, 2017 CM 4019 (Ct Martial) [Obele Ngoudni]; R v Buenacruz, 
2017 CM 4014 (Ct Martial) [Buenacruz]; R v Cadieux, 2017 CM 3008 (Ct Martial) [Cadieux], 
rev’d 2018 CMAC 3 (Ct Martial App Ct); R v Jackson, 2017 CM 3001 (Ct Martial) [Jackson]; R v 
Whitehead, 2016 CM 3007 (Ct Martial) [Whitehead]; R v Lloyd-Trinique, 2015 CM 3001 (Ct Martial) 
[Lloyd-Trinque]; R v Thibeault, 2015 CM 3004 (Ct Martial); R v Morel, 2014 CM 3026 (Ct Martial); 
R v Gagnon, 2014-08-22, rev’d 2018 CMAC 1 (Ct Martial App Ct) (acquitted by a General Courts 
Martial); R v McCarty, 2014 CM 3026 (Ct Martial); R v Youden, 2013 CM 4002 (Ct Martial); R v 
LeBlanc 2012 CM 3005 (Ct Martial). 
54. Nordstrom, supra note 53; MacIntyre, supra note 53; Obele Ngoudni, supra note 53; Buenacruz, 
supra note 53; Cadieux, supra note 53; Jackson, supra note 53; Whitehead, supra note 53; Lloyd-
Trinique, supra note 53; Laferrière, supra note 50. 
55. Beaudry, supra note 10.
56. Wilks, supra note 49.
57. Beaudry, supra note 10.
58. Wilks, supra note 49.
59. W(TS), supra note 49.
60. Cooper, supra note 49.
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consensual sexual touching in which the complainant was a woman, the 
accused was male, and the central issues in the case involved credibility 
and/or consent or mistaken belief in consent.61 With the exception of Wilks 
and Beaudry (in which, as noted, the original conviction was overturned), 
in every other court martial proceeding in the past four years which would 
fit this description the accused was either acquitted of sexual assault at 
trial62 or pled guilty to a non-Criminal Code offence under the National 
Defence Act, such as “behaved in a disgraceful manner”63 or “conduct 
to the prejudice of good order and discipline,”64 or in two cases was 
convicted of the lesser included Criminal Code offence of assault.65 In 
the cases involving guilty pleas to these military specific, non-Criminal 
Code offences, the sexual assault charges against the accused in those 
cases were stayed or withdrawn. In other words, pending a reversal of the 
Court Martial Appeals Court decision in Beaudry by the Supreme Court of 
Canada, since Operation Honour was launched in 2015 only one member 
of the Canadian Armed Forces, a medical technician who conducted 
inappropriate physical exams, has been convicted through courts martial 
proceedings of sexually assaulting a female member of the Canadian 
military. If the Beaudry conviction is upheld by the Supreme Court that 
number will be two.
What explains the significant discrepancy between top military 
officials’ claims regarding the military legal system’s treatment of 
sexualized violence and the startlingly low rate of conviction for the 
offence of sexual assault revealed by the reported courts martial caselaw? 
Some of the claims, such as General Vance’s assertion that conviction rates 
for both sexual assault and lesser offences are higher in the military legal 
system, appear to be simply inaccurate. As demonstrated, conviction rates 
for charges of sexual assault and lesser offences in the civilian system are 
dramatically higher than in courts martial proceedings. Other aspects of this 
61. In W(TS), supra note 49 consent was not an issue because the complainant was not old enough 
to legally consent.
62. In one case, Laferrière, supra note 50, the accused was acquitted of sexual assault at trial but 
convicted of the lesser included offence of assault. In one case, Scott, supra note 50, the accused pled 
guilty to assault.
63. National Defence Act, supra note 10, s 93.
64. Ibid, s 129.
65. Scott, supra note 50 (pled guilty to assault); Laferrière, supra note 50 (acquitted of sexual assault 
but convicted at trial of the lesser included offence of assault). In Ryan, supra note 50, the accused 
pled guilty to criminal harassment. This case involved a female complainant and a male accused but 
did not fit within the ‘typical sexual assault’ paradigm described above. It was a case of unwanted 
communication engaged in by the accused with respect to the complainant, his ex-girlfriend. The 
fourth conviction for a lesser included offence during this time period was in Gobin, supra note 50, 
which did not involve a female complainant.
16 The Dalhousie Law Journal
discrepancy can be understood by paying close attention to terminology. 
Whether it is General Vance’s statement that the conviction rate for sexual 
misconduct since launching Operation Honour is 87 per cent or the 70 
per cent rate of guilty findings for sexual misconduct reported by the JAG 
in her 2017–2018 annual report,66 these figures refer to a much broader 
category of harmful sexual behaviour than that which is captured by the 
offence of sexual assault. 
The National Defence Act creates a Code of Service Discipline that 
applies to all military personnel.67 The Code of Service Discipline combines 
under the term ‘service offences’ both Criminal Code offences (such as 
sexual assault and assault) and military specific disciplinary offences 
(such as ‘ill-treatment of a person who by reason of rank was subordinate,’ 
‘drunkenness,’ ‘conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline,’ 
and ‘disgraceful conduct’).68 The National Defence Act grants military 
tribunals jurisdiction over both types of offences. Recall that there are two 
tiers to the military justice system in Canada: the courts martial process, 
which has jurisdiction to prosecute the offence of sexual assault, and the 
more informal summary hearing process which adjudicates less serious 
offences.69 The summary process occurs at the unit level, without lawyers 
or judges, and is presided over by a member of the chain of command. 
These summary tribunals are frequently used to resolve allegations of 
harmful or inappropriate sexual behaviour. The CAF defines harmful or 
inappropriate sexual behaviour as: 
“behaviours that are inconsistent with the Profession of Arms” and may 
include such behaviour as unacceptable language or jokes, actions that 
devalue members on the basis of their sex, sexuality, or sexual orientation, 
accessing, distributing, or publishing in the workplace material of a sexual 
nature, offensive sexual remarks, exploitation of power relationships for 
the purposes of sexual activity, unwelcome requests of a sexual nature, 
verbal abuse of a sexual nature, or the publication of an intimate image 
of a person without their consent, voyeurism, indecent acts, sexual 
interference, sexual exploitation, and sexual assault.70 
66. Department of National Defence, Judge Advocate General Annual Report 2016-2017 (Ottawa: 
Office of the Judge Advocate General, 2017), online: <www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs-
military-law-annual-2016-17/index.page> [perma.cc/QFU5-N99Q]. 
67. National Defence Act, supra note 10.
68. Ibid.
69. See Bill C-77, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and to make related and consequential 
amendments to other Acts, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2018, online: <www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-
1/bill/C-77/royal-assent> [perma.cc/H4N9-JQV4] [Bill C-77] which re-designs the military legal 
system in Canada by re-naming ‘summary trials’ as ‘summary hearings’ and changing the nature 
of less serious service offences to make them more akin to administrative charges (called ‘service 
infractions’ under the Bill) rather than criminal offences.
70. Department of National Defence, Judge Advocate General Annual Report 2017-2018 (Ottawa: 
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Most infractions of the Code of Service Discipline, including those for 
harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour, are addressed through the 
summary process.71 In these circumstances the charge typically laid is 
‘conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline’ pursuant to section 
129 of the National Defence Act. This is a military specific disciplinary 
offence, a conviction for which does not always result in a criminal record72 
and never results in an order under the Sexual	 Offender	 Information	
Registration Act (SOIRA) requiring that the offender be included in the 
National Sex Offender Registry.73
As noted, summary tribunals do not have jurisdiction over the offence 
of sexual assault. Thus, where charges of sexual assault have been laid the 
matter must be resolved through the courts martial process (or referred 
to the civilian criminal justice system). In nearly all of the cases since 
2015 in which a CAF member was charged with sexual assault, they 
were also charged with a non-Criminal Code service offence pursuant 
to the National Defence Act—most commonly this charge was either 
drunkenness,74 conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline,75 or 
disgraceful conduct.76 Nearly all courts martial guilty findings for sexual 
misconduct involve plea bargains in which the accused pleads guilty to 
either the section 129 offence of ‘conduct to the prejudice of good order 
and discipline’ or the section 93 offence of ‘disgraceful conduct’ and in 
exchange the sexual assault charge is withdrawn or stayed.77
When military officials assert conviction rates of 87 per cent (as 
General Vance recently did) or 70 per cent (as Judge Advocate General 
Office of the Judge Advocate General, 2018) at FN 10, online (pdf): <www.canada.ca/content/dam/
dnd-mdn/migration/assets/FORCES_Internet/docs/en/jag/jag-annual-report-17-18.pdf> [perma.
cc/5QA7-JZXT].
71. See e.g. ibid.
72. National Defence Act, supra note 10, s 249.27(1)(2). Whether a conviction under section 129 
will result in a criminal record, and whether such a conviction is treated as a conviction for a criminal 
offence, depends on the type of sanction imposed.  
73. Sex	Offender	Information	Registration	Act, SC 2004, c 10.
74. National Defence Act, supra note 10, s 97.
75. Ibid, s 129.
76. Ibid, s 93.
77. In 2015 all of the courts martial sexual assault cases which resulted in guilty findings involved 
plea bargains for non-Criminal Code disciplinary offences. In 2016 four of the six guilty findings 
involved plea bargains of this nature. In 2017, all but one involved plea bargains of this nature and in 
2018 all but two. The accused pled guilty to a Criminal Code offence in only three cases involving 
charges of sexual assault during this period. In Ryan, supra note 50, the accused was charged with 
sexual assault and criminal harassment. He pled guilty to criminal harassment and received a severe 
reprimand and a $2,500 fine. In Scott, supra note 50, the accused was charged with sexual assault and 
conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline. He pled guilty to the lesser and included offence 
of assault and received a severe reprimand and a fine of $2000. In W(TS), supra note 49, discussed 
supra note 61, the accused pled guilty to sexual assault. 
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Commodore Geneviève Bernatchez recently did) they are referring to 
rates of conviction for sexual misconduct—the overwhelming majority 
of these guilty findings are not for the offence of sexual assault nor any 
other Criminal Code offence.78 The discrepancy between actual conviction 
rates for sexual assault by the Canadian military’s legal system and the 
claims of top military officials is explained by a combination of what 
appears to be inaccuracy (in the case of claims about military conviction 
rates for the offence of sexual assault) and a lack of distinction made 
between guilty findings for non-Criminal Code sexual misconduct and 
Criminal Code convictions for sexual offences (and lesser included 
Criminal Code offences). The former involves a much broader spectrum 
of behaviour including inappropriate jokes, sexual harassment, and the 
use of inappropriate language, and is frequently resolved through the more 
informal, unit level summary process.
III.	 Plea	bargaining	in	courts	martial	proceedings:	reprimands	and	fines
In only one case since 2015 has an accused pled guilty to the charge 
of sexual assault, and in that case the prosecution had photographs of 
him committing the sexual assault.79 The fact that the vast majority of 
the military legal system’s sexual assault cases are disposed of through 
plea bargains involving convictions for military specific non-Criminal 
Code disciplinary offences means that an assessment of the military legal 
system’s sexual assault cases requires closer consideration of these plea 
bargains.  
In several of the plea bargained cases since 2015, sexual assault 
charges were laid in response to conduct which would fall on the lower 
end of the spectrum of sexually assaultive behaviour, such as grabbing the 
complainant’s buttocks while dancing together;80 wrapping an arm around 
the complainant’s shoulders while asking for “a blow job”;81 or grabbing 
the complainant’s buttocks while engaging in a consensual hug.82 In these 
cases the accused avoided a conviction for sexual assault by pleading 
78. Indeed, the National Defence Act, supra note 10, s 249.27(1) specifically stipulates that, 
depending on the sentence imposed, an individual who has been convicted of conduct to the prejudice 
of good order and discipline has not been convicted of a criminal offence and will not have a criminal 
record. It is a disciplinary offence. 
79. W(TS), supra note 49.
80. R v Bernier, 2015 CM 3015 (Ct Martial) (pled guilty to conduct to the prejudice of good order 
and discipline under National Defence Act, supra note 10, s 129 and sentenced to a severe reprimand 
and a fine in the amount of $2000.00). 
81. R v Morgado, 2017 CM 4012 (Ct Martial) (pled guilty to disgraceful conduct under National 
Defence Act, supra note 10, s 93 and sentenced to a reprimand a fine of $1500.00).
82. R v Riddell, 2017 CM 1014 (Ct Martial) (pled guilty to disgraceful conduct under National 
Defence Act, supra note 10, s 93 and sentenced to a severe reprimand and a fine $1800.00).
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guilty to a disciplinary offence—most frequently disgraceful conduct or 
conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline. This is arguably the 
appropriate outcome in these types of cases, many of which would likely 
not have resulted in sexual assault charges in the civilian legal system. 
In some cases accused individuals pled guilty to these same 
disciplinary offences and received the same types of sanctions (typically a 
severe reprimand and a small fine) for sexually assaultive behaviour that 
is much more severe. Unfortunately, in courts martial proceedings the 
severity of the sexually harmful behaviour does not appear to inform the 
type of offence pleaded or sanction imposed. In other words, even in cases 
involving significantly harmful sexual behaviour, if a plea of guilty is 
entered it will be for a disciplinary offence such as conduct to the prejudice 
of good order and discipline, not a charge of sexual assault.83 
In some cases it seems highly problematic that sexual assault charges 
were stayed in exchange for pleading guilty to a non-Criminal Code 
disciplinary offence like conduct to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline or disgraceful conduct. To be clear, resolving cases involving 
very minor incidents by relying on convictions for non-Criminal Code, 
military specific disciplinary offences is arguably a positive practice.84 
However, it is problematic that in more serious cases an accused can 
avoid a sexual assault conviction by pleading guilty to a military specific, 
disciplinary offence such as disgraceful conduct, drunkenness, or conduct 
to the prejudice of good order and discipline. While cases of this nature 
were in the minority, that it occurs at all is concerning. Resolving more 
serious allegations of sexual assault through reliance on non-Criminal 
Code disciplinary charges seems highly unlikely to disrupt the widely held 
perception85 that the CAF does not respond adequately and justly to the 
sexualized violence prolific within its ranks. 
Consider, for example, the case of R v Brunelle.86 Brunelle engaged 
in repeated acts of non-consensual sexual contact over a period of several 
hours beginning at a local pub where a group of classmates had gathered 
to socialize and drink. The first incident involved a forced kiss on the 
complainant’s mouth: “he announced he would kiss J.L.P. hard on the 
83. For a discussion of this trend in plea bargaining in military sexual assault cases see e.g. Tim 
Dunne, “The Unremitting Problem of Sexual Crimes in Canada’s Military,” Lawyers Daily (6 
December 2017), online: <www.thelawyersdaily.ca/articles/5242/the-unremitting-problem-of-sexual-
crimes-in-canada-s-military-tim-dunne> [perma.cc/5ZU4-4E4Q]. 
84. Although given the differences in procedural fairness granted to accused in the military’s 
summary proceedings it may be an issue from a defence perspective at that level.
85. Deschamps Report, supra note 2 at ii.
86. R v Brunelle, 2017 CM 4001 (Ct Martial) [Brunelle].
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mouth, and did so, uninvited, while they were sitting at the table.”87 After 
returning to Gagetown Base the complainant stood in the foyer of the 
accommodations building with Brunelle while he waited for a taxi. Without 
warning, the accused, who was drunk and had rested his head on her arms 
while they waited, shoved both his hands down the complainant’s pants. 
She pushed him away, stating “I’m done, get in the cab” and then walked 
away.88 Instead of respecting her direction to leave her alone, Brunelle 
followed her down the hallway, came up behind her and again forced his 
hands down her pants. She began yelling for help from her course mates 
and then ran down the hallway to her room. He chased her down the hall 
and before she could lock the door to her room from the inside, followed 
her into her room and shoved his hands down her pants for a third time. 
She again pushed him away and yelled at him. After he left the room she 
immediately went to one of her course mates, visibly upset; she reported 
the attack to the military police shortly afterwards.89
This was an aggressive and repeated sexual assault on a colleague as 
she tried to escape him and called for help. Second Lieutenant Brunelle 
pled guilty to disgraceful conduct contrary to section 93 of the National 
Defence Act. In exchange, he was not charged with sexual assault.90 His 
sentence was composed of a severe reprimand and a fine of $3000.00, 
payable in monthly $300 installments. Brunelle was 34 years old when he 
sexually assaulted the complainant.91 In delivering his sentence, one of the 
mitigating factors highlighted by Judge Pelletier was Brunelle’s “strong 
potential for success and advancement in military service” as evidenced 
by his ability to succeed in performing his military duties even under these 
“trying circumstances”—by which he was referring to Brunelle’s military 
performance while this case was ongoing.92 Following the outcome of 
this proceeding Brunelle likely would have been subject to administrative 
review to determine whether he should remain in the military. Information 
as to whether he was discharged from the military is unavailable. 
87. Ibid at para 13.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
90. More typically an accused would be charged with both sexual assault and a disciplinary offence. 
The plea bargain would involve withdrawing or staying the sexual assault charge. Oddly, in this case 
the accused was not charged with sexual assault. The sentencing judge noted, ibid at para 27, “[a] 
reasonable person would also know that the prosecution has agreed to the substitution of a charge of 
disgraceful conduct to a sexual assault charge as part of an agreement by the accused to plead guilty 
to that charge and avoid a trial.”
91. Brunelle, supra note 86 at para 19. 
92. Ibid at para 21.
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Conversely, Judge Pelletier also noted that the complainant is still 
“reluctant to participate fully in all that military life has to offer by virtue 
of her fear of being hurt again.”93 The incident left J.L.P. in emotional 
turmoil. It shattered her belief in the camaraderie, trust, and mutual care 
she thought was present among members of the CAF. Years after the attack 
she remained afraid to trust her colleagues and anxious that she would be 
hurt when she was forced to attend social events as part of her military 
duties.94 Her military career does not appear to have emerged from this 
incident relatively unscathed. 
Women who have been sexually assaulted by fellow members of the 
CAF frequently identify these experiences of sexualized violence, and the 
inadequate response of the CAF to them, as the catalyst that stunted, if not 
ended, their military careers.95 The outcome for the accused and the impact 
on the complainant in R v Chapman exemplifies the profound unfairness 
of this circumstance.96 
While in Cyprus as part of a decompression program following 
deployment to Afghanistan, Chapman knocked on the complainant’s 
hotel room door at approximately 3:00am. Chapman was her superior (in 
rank). He gained entry to her room by falsely stating that he was unable 
to sleep in his own room because his roommate was there with a woman 
and thus he needed to use the complainant’s spare bed. Once in the room 
he repeatedly asked to get in bed with her, which she refused. He then 
attempted to force himself on her, kissed her, groped at her breasts and 
attempted to initiate sexual intercourse.97 She told him to “get the fuck out 
of the room” and got him off her bed.98 He promised he would leave her 
alone if she let him sleep in the spare bed. She agreed, following which 
he again attacked her, kissing her face and trying to grab her breasts. 
Although panicked, she managed to fight him off by pushing him towards 
the door, with him pushing back away from the door. Chapman left only 
93. Ibid at para 18.
94. Ibid at para 14.
95. See e.g. Heyder v Canada (AG), 2018 FC 432 (female statement of claim, online: <ravenlaw.
com/armed-forces-class-action/> [perma.cc/9YVD-UJGY] [Statement of Claim] PDF on file with 
author. This class action was filed on behalf of thousands of military men and women who alleged 
that they had experienced sexual misconduct.  The federal government settled the lawsuit in July, 
2019 for 900 million: Mercedes Stephenson & Amanda Connolly, “Feds Agree to $900M settlement 
over military sexual misconduct class action,” Global News (18 Jully 2019), online: <globalnews.ca/
news/5655519/military-sexual-misconduct-canada/> [perma.cc/8S6G-BUR3].
96. R v Chapman, 2016 CM 4019 (Ct Martial) [Chapman].
97. See e.g. Statement of Claim, supra note 95 at para 61.  (The complainant was a named plaintiff 
in this class action.)
98. Chapman, supra note 96 at para 13.
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after the complainant, while pushing him forcefully, threatened to call the 
military police.99
The complainant was shaken and terrified following the attack. She 
was diagnosed with severe post-traumatic stress disorder as a consequence 
of the sexual assault. She left the military and has had to undergo intense 
treatment to address her symptoms, which precluded her from working 
as a civilian.100 Chapman pled guilty to disgraceful conduct and received 
a sentence of reduction in rank and a fine of $2,500.00 (which amounted 
to slightly more than two weeks of salary for him).101 According to a 
statement of claim filed in 2017 on behalf of the complainant, Chapman 
remains a member of the Canadian Armed Forces.102 
In both Brunelle and Chapman Judge Pelletier identified the following 
as a mitigating factor: “He has also allowed the victim to have a voice at the 
sentencing hearing, thereby demonstrating his consideration to what she 
has had to go through as a result of his actions.”103 In the civilian criminal 
justice system victims of crime have the statutory right to present a victim 
impact statement at sentencing.104 Inexplicably, the Canadian Victims Bill 
of Rights did not originally apply to court martial proceedings.105 While 
the National Defence Act has now been amended to grant complainants 
the ability to provide victim impact statements this change was not in force 
when Brunelle and Chapman were sentenced.106 It seems problematic for 
a military judge to point to an accused’s magnanimity in ‘allowing’ his 
victim to have a voice at the sentencing hearing given that if the matter 
had proceeded in civilian court the victim would have a statutory right 
to inform the sentencing judge of the impact on her caused by the sexual 
assault.
The National Defence Act creates an escalating scale of punishments 
available to military judges. In increasing level of severity they are: minor 
punishment, fine, reprimand, severe reprimand, forfeiture of seniority, 
reduction in rank, detention, dismissal from Her Majesty’s Service, 
99. Ibid.
100. See Chapman, supra note 96 at para 16; Statement of Claim, supra note 95. 
101. Chapman, supra note 96 at para 27.
102. Statement of Claim, supra note 95.
103. Brunelle, supra note 86 at para 21; Chapman, supra note 96 at para 17.
104. Canadian Victims Bill of Rights, SC 2015, c 13 at s 15 [Victims Bill of Rights].
105. See Bill C-77, supra note 69, s 61 which amends the National Defence Act to fall under the 
purview of the Victims Bill of Rights, ibid, but only in cases in which the accused was facing a sentence 
of incarceration.
106. National Defence Act, supra note 10, s 203.6(1). The version of the Act in force in 2016/2017 
created the discretion to introduce victim impact statements. Rather than granting victims this right, 
however, these statements could be excluded if the court believed it would “not be in the best interests 
of the administration of justice” to allow them.
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imprisonment for less than two years, dismissal with disgrace from Her 
Majesty’s service, imprisonment for two years or more, and imprisonment 
for life.107 The sentences imposed on the accused in Brunelle and Chapman 
were at the very low end of this scale. Reprimands, for example, have no 
concrete consequence beyond their pronouncement. While the severity of 
sanction is by no means the only, or even the most important, criteria by 
which to assess whether a just outcome was achieved, it is nevertheless 
important in the context of these plea bargains to consider the nature of 
these sentences. 
The National Defence Act requires military judges to impose sentences 
that are proportionate to the gravity of the offence.108 This requirement 
reflects a “fundamental principle of sentencing”109—that there ought to 
be a readily apparent connection between the severity of the sanction and 
the degree of moral culpability and social and legal recognition of the 
harm caused and denounced. By repeatedly indicating that the sanction of 
a fine and reprimand or reduction in rank is commensurate with the gravity 
of the offence in cases like Brunelle and Chapman, the military’s legal 
system sends the wrong message to women (and men) in the CAF. One of 
the primary justifications offered in support of permitting the military to 
operate its own parallel legal system is the claim that the need for military 
discipline necessitates the ability to impose stricter punishments. The 
Supreme Court of Canada accepted this justification in R v Généreux: 
The purpose of a separate system of military tribunals is to allow the 
Armed Forces to deal with matters that pertain directly to the discipline, 
efficiency and morale of the military. (…) Breaches of military discipline 
must be dealt with speedily and, frequently, punished more severely than 
would be the case if a civilian engaged in such conduct. As a result, the 
military has its own Code of Discipline to allow it to meet its particular 
disciplinary needs.110
Similarly, then Minister of Defence Arthur Eggleton’s argument in support 
of granting military courts concurrent jurisdiction over sexual offences was 
that the detrimental impact of sexual assault on the morale and cohesion 
of military units demanded tougher penalties and that the military’s legal 
system would be more likely to offer these stricter sanctions.111 Imposing 
107. Ibid, s 139.
108. Ibid, s 203.2.
109. Ibid.
110. R v Généreux, [1992] 1 SCR 259, 88 DLR 4th 110.
111. Testimony of Eggleton, supra note 11: “We cannot afford to have sexual assault occur. In many 
respects, the penalties may well be tougher when we deal with it. It needs to be tougher for the 
cohesion of the unit.” 
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modest fines, reprimands, and reductions in rank for repetitive acts of 
sexual aggression is not consistent with either the overall justification for 
having a courts martial system articulated in Généreux or the purported 
purpose of granting Canadian military courts concurrent jurisdiction over 
sexual assault in particular. 
In addition to the issue of severity of sanction, there is also the issue 
of parity of sanction. A basic principle of sentencing establishes that like 
offences be treated alike.112 In R v Mensah, the accused received virtually 
the same sentence as in Brunelle (a severe reprimand and a $2500.00 fine) 
for failing to report a consensual, personal relationship with someone 
in his chain of command.113 In R v Euper the accused received a more 
severe sentence than in Brunelle and virtually the same sentence as in 
Chapman (a reduction in rank and a $1500.00 fine) for making sexually 
suggestive comments and on one occasion hugging the complainant, and 
on another briefly rubbing her shoulders.114 In R v Riddell the accused was 
sanctioned with a severe reprimand and a fine of $1800.00 for grabbing the 
complainant’s buttocks during a consensual hug.115 Repeatedly imposing 
the same minimal sanctions for aggressive sexual assaults as are imposed 
for administrative breaches like failing to disclose a personal relationship 
or relatively minor incidents of non-consensual touching is problematic. 
The outcome in cases like Chapman and Brunelle sends the message that 
violating the sexual integrity of a fellow member of the CAF is not a 
serious infraction in the Canadian military. 
Unfortunately, this message is amplified by some of the commentary in 
courts martial sentencing decisions—statements that minimize the severity 
or culpability of sexually harmful behaviour. For example, referring to the 
impact on the complainant in Chapman, Judge Pelletier commented: 
[s]he does not attribute all of the symptoms she experienced and continues 
experiencing to the actions of the offender but I agree with her views on 
the importance that one’s disgraceful actions may have on those affected 
by this behaviour. What might seem as “no big deal” by an offender or 
bystander at the time may have a profound impact on someone else.116 
112. R v Arcand, 2010 ABCA 363. This principle is instantiated in section 203.3(b) of the National 
Defence Act, supra note 10.
113. R v Mensah, 2017 CM (Ct Martial) 3018.
114. R v Euper, 2018 CM (Ct Martial) 2012.
115. R v Riddell, 2017 CM (Ct Martial) 1014.
116. Chapman, supra note 96 at para 7. Judge Pelletier appears in this passage to be referring to the 
complainant’s concession that not all of her ongoing mental health symptoms stemmed from the sexual 
assault. In her statement the complainant indicated that the sexual assault occurred at a time when she 
was already vulnerable. While this explains why Judge Pelletier may have made this statement it does 
not explain or justify the minimizing nature of his characterization of the wrongful behaviour.
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The incident in Chapman, like Brunelle, was an aggressive, repetitive 
sexual assault that ended only because the complainant managed to 
physically fight her attacker off. It minimizes, if not trivializes, the offence 
to refer to it simply as disgraceful behaviour, even if the choice of language 
is a function of the offence to which the accused pled guilty (disgraceful 
conduct). This is one of the difficulties with using these military specific, 
non-Criminal Code offences to respond to what are serious sexual assaults. 
In terms of social legibility and the expressive and norm setting function 
that a legal system is intended to serve in denouncing harmful sexual 
behaviour a conviction for disgraceful conduct is not remotely the same as 
a conviction for sexual assault. Judge Pelletier’s gratuitous and puzzling 
suggestion in Chapman that the offender or an unidentified “bystander” 
might characterize the conduct as “no big deal” compounds the problem.
Similarly, in delivering his sentence in Brunelle Judge Pelletier noted 
that there could be no “suggestion to the effect that the behaviour admitted 
to by the offender is somehow akin to offences frequently committed by 
junior personnel getting intoxicated during breaks from stressful career 
courses.”117 This is also a problematic statement. Was Judge Pelletier 
suggesting with this comment that it would less culpable for a younger man 
to chase a classmate down a hallway repeatedly thrusting his hands down 
her pants as she screamed for help? Was he suggesting that a combination 
of alcohol and exam stress might rationalize this type of aggressive sexual 
attack? 
Commentary in courts martial sentencing decisions that minimizes 
military sexual trauma is likely to reinforce the perception that the CAF 
does not take seriously, or respond adequately to, sexualized violence. 
While in both of these cases Judge Pelletier suggested that the conduct 
was serious, the type of conviction, the sentences imposed, the fact that the 
outcome of the courts martial did not result in the accuseds’ dismissal from 
the CAF and some of the commentary in the decisions were inconsistent 
with this characterization. It is of very modest significance to assert that 
sexually violative conduct constitutes an extremely serious offence with 
serious implications if the actual outcome and consequences suggest the 
opposite. 
Responsibility for these sentences does not lie exclusively with the 
military judge. With plea bargains come joint sentencing recommendations 
—recommendations which receive a high degree of deference from the 
judge. In assessing the response of the military’s legal system to sexual 
assault, and in particular its reliance on guilty pleas to non-Criminal Code 
117. Brunelle, supra note 86 at para 15.
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charges in exchange for withdrawing the sexual assault charge, we must 
ask: why are military prosecutors agreeing to plea bargains of this kind in 
cases like Brunelle and Chapman? 
IV. Sexual assault trials conducted by courts martial
What happened in the cases, since Operation Honour was adopted, in 
which charges of sexual assault were not stayed or withdrawn in exchange 
for pleading guilty to a non-Criminal Code service offence? In the vast 
majority of these cases, the vast majority of which involved female 
complainants, the accused was acquitted. 
The reported decisions of courts martial judges since 2015 indicate 
that there have been 14 military trials involving charges of sexual assault 
during this time period.118 12 of these trials involved female service 
members as complainants and male service members as accused.119 Of the 
12 sexual assault cases involving female service members as complainants 
that have gone to trial in the military courts since 2015 only two have 
resulted in convictions for sexual assault—Beaudry and Wilks, discussed 
above. In the other ten trials the accused was acquitted of sexual assault.120 
(In one of these ten trials the accused was acquitted of sexual assault but 
convicted of the lesser included offence of assault.121) Before considering 
these acquittals one might ask, why focus on female complainants, and 
female service members in particular? 
It is important to consider the military’s sexual assault trials involving 
female members of the CAF in particular for two reasons. First, as is the 
case in the civilian context, women are much more likely to be sexually 
assaulted and the sexual assaults that they experience are more severe than 
those experienced by their male counterparts. In both the 2016 and 2018 
118. Nordstrom, supra note 53; MacIntyre, supra note 53; Cooper, supra note 49; Gobin, supra note 
50; Obele Ngoudni, supra note 53; Buenacruz, supra note 53; Cadieux, supra note 53; Wilks, supra 
note 49; Jackson, supra note 53; Whitehead, supra note 53; Laferrière, supra note 50; Beaudry, supra 
note 10; Lloyd-Trinque, supra note 53; Thibeault, supra note 53. 
119. The two cases involving male complainants were Cooper, supra note 49 and Gobin, supra note 
50.
120. Nordstrom, supra note 53; MacIntyre, supra note 53; Obele Ngoudni, supra note 53; Buenacruz, 
supra note 53; Cadieux, supra note 53; Jackson, supra note 53; Whitehead, supra note 53; Lloyd-
Trinique, supra note 53; Laferrière, supra note 50. Nine of these ten trials were presided over by a 
military judge alone. These are referred to as Standing Courts Martial. R v MacIntyre, the tenth trial, 
proceeded as a General Courts Martial, which involves a military judge as the trier of law and a panel 
of five military members as the triers of fact. The nine Standing Courts Martial resulted in reported 
decisions. As with civilian jury trials, there is no reported decision from a General Courts Martial. 
The five panel members in R v MacIntyre were all men. See Aly Thomson, “Military panels should 
have gender parity, advocate says after N.S. acquittal”, CBC (29 June 2018), online: <www.cbc.ca/
news/canada/nova-scotia/military-panels-gender-parity-sexual-assault-acquittal-1.4727703> [perma.
cc/26N8-MZD9].
121. Laferrière, supra note 50.
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Statistics Canada surveys on sexual misconduct in the CAF, Regular Force 
women members reported rates of sexual assault in the previous 12 months 
that were four times higher than their male counterparts.122 Moreover, 
according to the 2016 survey, women in the military are 18 times more 
likely than men to report being the victim of a “sexual attack.”123 
Second, the rates of sexual assault against women in the military are 
higher than in the general population124 and have been connected to the 
military’s culture.125 In 2015 over 27 per cent of female service members 
reported experiencing at least one incident of sexual assault over the 
course of their military career.126 For women who had been in the military 
for more than 15 years the rate was 37.7 per cent.127 The Deschamps 
Report highlighted the connection between rates of sexualized violence 
in the military and “an underlying sexualized culture in the CAF that is 
hostile to women.”128 In addition, historically the legal response to sexual 
assault generally in Canada has been plagued by a set of problematic 
stereotypes about women that informed the rules of evidence, the treatment 
of complainants at trial, and the substantive legal definition of concepts 
such as consent.129 The legacy of these discriminatory assumptions about 
women and sex undoubtedly continue to have an impact on the application 
and interpretation of sexual assault law by both military and civilian 
courts.130 Put simply, sexual assault is a gendered offence. In assessing the 
military legal system’s conduct of sexual assault trials it is critical to focus 
on proceedings involving women complainants. 
Recall that since commencement of Operation Honour in 2015 courts 
martial proceedings have resulted in only two convictions for sexual 
assault of a female service member (and one of those two convictions 
was overturned on appeal and is currently before the Supreme Court of 
122. Statistics Canada, 2018, supra note 1; Statistics Canada, 2016, supra note 1 at 11. In the 12 
months preceding the 2016 survey 4.8 percent of women members and 1.2 percent of male members 
reported having experienced sexual assault. 
123. Statistics Canada, supra note 1 at 15.
124. Ibid at 11.
125. Deschamps Report, supra note 2.
126. Statistics Canada, 2016, supra note 1. Given the alarming rates of sexual assault reported by 
women in the Canadian military, one should ask why there have been so few charges and even fewer 
trials prosecuting this offence. The answer to this question is complex. It involves factors such as 
underreporting (which is also a severe problem in the civilian context), conclusions by the military 
police that a high number of complaints are unfounded (in September, 2018 the CAF reopened 
numerous sexual assault investigations that were originally designated as ‘unfounded’ and closed), and 
the fact that (an unknown) percentage of cases may be referred by the military to civilian prosecutors.
127. Ibid.
128. Deschamps Report, supra note 2 at i.
129. Supra note 19.
130. Ibid.
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Canada131). In the other ten trials, all of which were presided over by two 
specific judges, the accused was acquitted of sexual assault. Are there 
insights about the Canadian military’s conduct of sexual assault trials to 
be gleaned from the ten cases, since Operation Honour, in which male 
service members have been acquitted of sexually assaulting female service 
members? Can these insights explain the strikingly low rate of conviction 
for this offence by Canada’s courts martial system? 
With such a small sample of cases, and given the preliminary nature 
of this research, it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions to explain 
the military’s low conviction rate. However, a preliminary analysis of this 
caselaw does produce two insights. First, it indicates that further study 
of the Canadian military’s sexual assault caselaw is critically needed. 
Second, it suggests that in some of these decisions the assessment of 
evidence appears to be underpinned by, or infused with, assumptions on 
the part of the military judge that reveal a lack of awareness of, or refusal 
to recognize, the social context in which these allegations are brought. 
Relatedly, the reasoning in some cases raises the prospect of a problematic 
reliance, by the military judge, on empirically unsound assumptions about 
Canadian military culture. Consider, for example, the decisions in R v 
Obele-Ngoudni and R v Buenacruz. 
In R v Obele Ngoudni the complainant was a reservist in the 35th 
Combat Engineer Regiment assigned to an all-male section of paratroopers 
deployed to Poland. She was the only woman, the only reservist, and 
the only non-paratrooper. She injured her ankle shortly after the section 
arrived in Poland, during a forced march. She alleged two incidents against 
Master-Corporal Obele Ngoudni, both occurring after she had injured her 
ankle. She alleged that on one occasion, while walking with a cane, Obele 
Ngoudni approached her from behind and delivered a severe kick to her 
buttocks between her anus and tailbone, which he seemed to minimize by 
laughing, and suggesting that it had not been a strong blow.  She testified 
to a second incident in which Obele Ngoudni pushed a piece of metal 
against her anus while she was bent down to pick up a drill.132
Obele Ngoudni was acquitted on the basis that the prosecution had 
failed to meet its standard of proof. The two primary weaknesses in the 
prosecution’s case identified by Judge Pelletier related to the timing of 
the alleged incidents and an explanation for the accused’s behaviour. It is 
Judge Pelletier’s reasoning regarding the latter which is of concern.133 In 
131. Beaudry, supra note 10.
132. Obele Ngoudni, supra note 53.
133. In terms of timing, the complainant gave a range of dates for each incident. The accused’s evidence 
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terms of the latter, he concluded that the complainant’s version of events 
raised doubts about their likelihood of occurring for the following reasons: 
i) that the prosecution had not presented any evidence of any context that 
could provide a starting point for this otherwise irrational act, especially 
given the fact that Master Corporal Obele Ngoudni had received multiple 
briefings and presentations on the importance of exemplary behaviour in 
light of concerns about the issues of harassment and sexual misconduct in 
the CAF; and ii) that kicking a “wounded sister” is an act of great malignity 
that is contrary to any notion of acceptable behaviour within the CAF.134 
First, the evidence that Judge Pelletier appears to have accepted did 
not support his conclusion that the prosecution failed to provide any 
evidence of a context that would support the complainant’s allegations. 
Indeed, far from lacking ‘any evidence of any context’ to explain these 
acts of violence, there was a great deal of contextual evidence relevant to 
the complainant’s allegations that was ignored in Judge Pelletier’s reasons.
Judge Pelletier states in his decision that the only context the 
prosecution presented was that the complainant was the only woman, 
the only reservist, and the only member of the section who was not a 
paratrooper, but that this evidence was not followed by any evidence that 
these differences may have led to acts of discrimination or improper or 
even unfair treatment by her colleagues. 135 In fact the complainant, who 
he found to be a frank, calm, and objective witness, offered significant 
evidence of precisely the kinds of social dynamics which give rise to 
gender based harassment, discrimination, and attack. While she did testify 
that her integration into the unit was unproblematic, she also testified that 
the atmosphere in the section deteriorated after she injured her ankle. She 
testified to a previous altercation with the accused during a demolition 
exercise. She recounted incidents in which vulgar, sexual jokes were made 
by other members of the section in her presence.136 She indicated that she 
regarding the timing of these incidents was aimed at establishing a timeline for his whereabouts during 
this period of his deployment in Poland. His timeline established that he was in the same location as 
the complainant for a portion of the date range she offered regarding the first incident (ibid at para 
30). His evidence was that he was not in her location during the date range she offered for the second 
incident. Judge Pelletier indicated in his decision that he would be remiss to resolve this case based 
solely on the technical question of dates.
134. This is a translation of the decision, which was written in French. This might explain the 
awkwardness of this phrasing. Obele Ngoudni, supra note 53 at para 33: “Tel que mentionné par 
l’avocat de la défense, les gestes allégués, surtout le premier incident où le caporal-chef Obele 
Ngoudni aurait asséné un violent coup de pied par-derrière à une consœur blessée qui se déplaçait 
avec peine à l’aide d’une canne, constituent un geste d’une grande méchanceté qui est contraire à toute 
notion de comportement acceptable au sein des Forces armées canadiennes (FAC).”
135. Ibid.
136. Ibid at para 2.
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had spoken to the section’s resource person for harassment and sexual 
misconduct about her situation and that ultimately, after the issues with 
the accused, she filed a harassment complaint against a number of the 
members of this otherwise all male section. She informed the Court that 
she was transferred to another section after this complaint was filed. She 
testified that she did not originally complain about either of the alleged 
incidents perpetrated by Obele Ngoudni because she did not trust her chain 
of command, who she identified as her immediate supervisors within the 
section.137 Her evidence very much suggested the type of context in which 
exclusionary and discriminatory gender based treatment seems to flourish.
There was also evidence of this problematic context from defence 
witnesses. For example, the section commander testified as to his perception 
of the complainant’s performance and attitude while on deployment. In his 
estimation she failed to perform her duties and keep up during physical 
exercises, refused to accept help, relied on medical issues to avoid fitness 
exercises, and blamed more experienced soldiers in front of the troop 
when her failings were revealed.138 Other members of the section, several 
of whom were the subjects of her harassment complaint, also testified for 
the defence. They too reported deficiencies in her job performance. Some 
of them also confirmed that vulgar, sexual jokes were exchanged among 
members of the section (but could not confirm whether she was present for 
any of these exchanges).139
Rather than a lack of any evidence of any context that could rationalize 
Obele Ngoudni’s alleged acts of aggression towards the complainant, on 
Judge Pelletier’s own account of the evidence the record was replete with 
indications that there were problems with the complainant’s integration into 
this all-male military section. His conclusion that there was no evidence of 
a context that would support her narrative of events and thus a conviction 
would require him to conclude that Obele Ngoudni had inexplicably and 
gratuitously kicked her and poked her in the anus was wrong.
A second related and problematic aspect of the reasoning he relied 
upon to support the acquittal was his conclusion that kicking a “wounded 
sister” would be an act of great malignity that is contrary to any notion 
of acceptable behaviour within the CAF.140 Inappropriate sexual jokes, 
women members’ distrust of the chain of command, and gender based 
exclusion and ostracization from the unit were all factors contributing to 
137. Ibid at paras 3-4.
138. Ibid at para 7.
139. Ibid at para 8.
140. Ibid at para 33.
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the CAF’s culture of hostility towards women identified in the Deschamps 
Report.141 In 2016, 31 per cent of women members of the CAF reported 
being personally targeted by sexualized or discriminatory behaviour in the 
workplace or involving military members in the previous 12 months.142 
These behaviours included unwanted sexual touching and insults and 
exclusion based on their sex. In 2018, 28 per cent of women in the Regular 
Force reported having experienced this type of sexual harassment in the 
previous 12 months.143 It is not necessarily that Judge Pelletier should 
have taken judicial notice of the relationship between male dominated 
workplaces and the sexual harassment of women, or of the CAF’s culture 
of hostility towards women, or of the connection between this culture and 
the rate of sexual assault in the CAF. But to draw the opposite conclusion 
because the type of seemingly unprovoked abuse alleged by the 
complainant in this case is antithetical to the values of the CAF is deeply 
problematic and empirically unsound. To do so in the face of admitted 
evidence demonstrating precisely the social dynamics which produce the 
type of gendered violence alleged in this case is even worse. As Madame 
Deschamps noted in her report, “there is a significant disjunction between 
the aspiration of the CAF to embody a professional military ethos which 
embraces the principle of respect for the dignity of all persons, and the 
reality experienced by many CAF members, day-to-day.”144 
Judge Pelletier relied upon a similar assertion about the Canadian 
military’s culture to support an acquittal in the case of R v Buenacruz.145 
The accused in Buenacruz was charged with the Criminal Code offences 
of sexual assault and obtaining sexual services for consideration. He was 
a warrant officer and the complainant was a corporal at the time of the 
incident. In addition to the Criminal Code offences Beunacruz was also 
charged with disgraceful conduct and conduct to the prejudice of good 
order and discipline. Judge Pelletier acquitted him of all charges.146 
There was a significant gap in age and military experience between 
the accused and the complainant. Buenacruz was her superior in rank, 
was the training officer for the unit and thus had some involvement in 
assigning future career courses, was friends with her direct supervisors 
141. Deschamps Report, supra note 2 at ii, iii, 60: “there is a sexualized culture in the CAF, particularly 
among members of lower rank. This sexualized culture is manifested through the pervasive use of 
language that is demeaning to women, sexual jokes and innuendos, and low-level harassment (ibid at 
13).
142. Statistics Canada, 2016, supra note 1 at 5.
143. Statistics Canada, 2018, supra note 1 at 4.
144. Deschamps Report, supra note 2 at 12.
145. Buenacruz, supra note 53.
146. Ibid.
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and was decades older. The complainant alleged that he approached her at 
the end of the workday in April, 2016 and asked to speak to her regarding 
a very personal favour. She alleged that he asked her if he could pay her 
to have sex with him. She testified that she told him she “didn’t know, 
maybe…”147 She explained that she said this because she was uncomfortable, 
had respected him as a superior, just wanted to get out of the situation, and 
was afraid of the impact he could have on her career and work duties given 
his role as the training warrant officer for the unit if she outright declined 
his solicitation.148
 On a date a few weeks later she received four phone calls within a 
two hour period from Buenacruz—who before that day had never called 
her. Some from phones on the military base and others from a pay phone. 
The first and second calls she ignored and when she picked up the third 
call he hung up. On the fourth call, which she answered, Buenacruz asked 
her if she wanted to meet up the next day to which she indicated she didn’t 
know, that she was busy. In response, he told her to meet him the next 
day at 10 am in a parking lot behind a shopping mall. The call lasted 
approximately one minute. On cross-examination she insisted that he told, 
not asked, her to meet him behind the mall the next day. She testified that 
she agreed to do so because she felt she had no other option, that she could 
not refuse without “pissing him off,” and that she was scared of what he 
could do to her in terms of work duties and career.149 They did meet the 
next day in the parking lot. She performed oral sex on him. He ejaculated 
in her mouth. She testified that she did not, at any point, want to have 
sexual contact with him.150
The accused testified that she initiated the conversation about 
performing oral sex on him, that he jokingly suggested he would have 
to pay her for a “blow job” and that the sexual activity which ultimately 
occurred was consensual.151
Like in Obele Ngoudni, the complainant testified to inappropriate 
jokes or unwelcome gendered comments by members of her artillery unit 
(including in her case those above her in her chain of command). She 
described, for example, an incident in which her supervisor told her in 
front of the entire troop that girls do not become women until they have 
a baby and that women cannot lead. According to her this Sergeant knew 
that she had suffered a miscarriage and was unable to have children when 
147. Ibid at para 14.
148. Ibid.
149. Ibid at para 15.
150. Ibid at para 8.
151. Ibid at paras 18-21.
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he said this to her.152 Like in Obele Ngoudni, the complainant’s evidence in 
Buenacruz was that she was ostracized by her predominantly male unit. She 
testified that subordinates did not comply with her directions, presumably 
implying that, like in Obele Ngoudni, there was a perception among unit 
members that she lacked the capacity to perform her duties competently.153 
When she joined the unit of approximately 500, at age 22, she was one of 
approximately ten women. Like the complainant in Obele Ngoudni she did 
not trust her chain of command, had filed multiple complaints against male 
members of her unit, and was eventually re-assigned.154 
The prosecution’s theory in Buenacruz was that:
…Corporal XX was and still is, to a large extent, an outcast in the 
Artillery, and was especially seen as such by the leadership at 1 RCHA in 
2016. That made her vulnerable in the eye of Warrant Officer Buenacruz, 
a much older man in a position of power who decided to prey on Corporal 
XX to obtain sexual favours he could not get from his wife. Should a 
complaint be made against him, Warrant Officer Buenacruz could safely 
be certain that no one would believe what she had to say in another of 
her complaints over his word as a respected senior non-commissioned 
officer within his unit.155
There are several problematic features of the reasoning supporting 
an acquittal on all charges in Buenacruz.156 In an effort to elucidate the 
similarities between aspects of the reasoning in this case and in Obele 
Ngoudni this discussion will focus on only one: Judge Pelletier’s conclusion 
that consent to the sexual conduct at issue in this case was not induced by 
an abuse of trust, power or authority contrary to section 273.1(2) of the 
Criminal Code.157 
This provision of the Criminal Code stipulates that “no consent is 
obtained…where the accused induces the complainant to engage in the 
activity by abusing a position of trust, power or authority.”158 While he 
agreed that the accused was in a position of authority over the complainant, 
152. Ibid at para 12.
153. Ibid at paras 12-13.
154. Ibid.
155. Ibid at para 24.
156. For example, his reasoning with respect to the allegation that Buenacruz had communicated for 
the purposes of offering consideration in exchange for sex was problematic. He concluded that on the 
complainant’s evidence alone, Buenacruz’s communication was intended to determine whether the 
complainant would be willing to perform oral sex in exchange for money rather than to set a price and 
other details and as such he was not satisfied it constituted communication for the purpose of obtaining 
sexual services for consideration (ibid at para 93).
157. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c 46.
158. Ibid, s 273.1(2).
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Judge Pelletier found that the prosecution had proven neither an abuse of 
that authority, nor that the complainant had been induced to consent.
Consider first his conclusion that the prosecution failed to prove 
that the complainant was subjectively induced to consent. Whether a 
complainant was induced to participate in the sexual activity by the 
accused’s abuse of his position is to be determined subjectively, with 
reference to the complainant’s subjective state of mind in relation to the 
consent.159 The surrounding circumstances may provide an evidentiary 
basis for consideration by the trier of fact in determining whether consent 
was vitiated by the operation of section 273.1(2)(c).160 A circumstance 
the trier of fact may consider to be relevant to this assessment is the 
vulnerability of the complainant.161 
Judge Pelletier found that the complainant’s assertion that she did not 
know what to do and that she was afraid of what Buenacruz could do to her 
career was not credible.162 In addition to stating that he was not convinced 
that Buenacruz initiated the sexual advances, he based his finding that she 
was not induced to consent largely on the conclusion that the complainant 
was “not the type of person…who would feel she had little choice but to 
go along with sexual activity with a superior” because she was “familiar 
with the complaints mechanism available to members of the CAF.”163 He 
pointed to harassment complaints she had filed against other members 
of the unit for sexist comments prior to the incident with Buenacruz, to 
her response to sexualized and discriminatory statements made about her 
online by members of the unit following her complaint against Buenacruz, 
and to her awareness of the Deschamps Report to support this conclusion.164
Consider this point further. Evidence of her awareness of the military’s 
complaints system, an awareness she possessed because she was (like the 
complainant in Obele Ngoudni) unfortunate enough to have allegedly 
experienced multiple forms of discrimination and harassment from 
multiple members of her almost exclusively male unit, was relied upon 
to conclude that she was “not the type of person” who would believe she 
159. R v Long, 2015 ONSC 4509 at para 46 [Long].
160. R v Snelgrove, 2018 NLCA 59 at paras 24-25 [Snelgrove].
161. Ibid.
162. Buenacruz, supra note 53 at para 70. He also determined that it was not an objectively reasonable 
belief which is not the correct legal test for this issue. The test is based on the impact of the abuse of 
authority on the complainant’s actual state of mind. Although Judge Pelletier made this finding that 
he couldn’t conclude that her belief was objectively reasonable his analysis appears to have been 
focussed subjective factors (ibid at paras 70-73).
163. Ibid at para 71.
164. Ibid.
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had no options.165 Instead of recognizing her ostracization from the unit, 
her testimony that superiors had made sexist and insensitive comments 
towards her, her awareness of the culture of hostility towards women in the 
CAF documented in the Deschamps Report, and online sexual harassment 
of her by other members of the unit in response to her complaint against 
Buenacruz, as evidence of her incredible vulnerability, these factors were 
used to conclude the opposite.
His determination that there was no abuse of authority was equally 
problematic. First he applied the wrong legal test to this aspect of his 
reasoning. He concluded that “there were no threats, promises or allusions 
of favourable treatment made by Warrant Officer Buenacruz.”166 To 
establish that the sexual contact was non-consensual under this provision 
the prosecution must show that “there was a power imbalance between the 
parties” and “that the accused used this imbalance to apply some subtle 
form of pressure on the complainant to consent.”167 The “threshold is not 
a high one.”168 It does not require coercion.169 The key question is whether 
the accused exploited the power imbalance to secure an apparent consent 
to the sexual activity.170 The provision is “engaged when an accused 
abuses, that is, misuses or makes improper use of his position of trust or 
authority, thereby inducing, that is, persuading or enticing the complainant 
to consent to sexual activity.”171 It “addresses the kinds of relationships in 
which an apparent consent to sexual activity is rendered illusory by the 
dynamics of the relationship between the accused and the complainant, 
and by the misuse of the influence vested in the accused by virtue of that 
relationship.”172 Contrary to Judge Pelletier’s reasoning, it does not require 
evidence of threats or quid pro quo promises. 
Buenacruz took no steps to ensure that the complainant was aware 
that she did not have to engage in sexual activity with him by virtue of 
his rank. He called her four times in less than two hours on the day before 
the incident. According to the complainant he approached her at work. 
(Judge Pelletier reasoned that even if he had accepted the complainant’s 
evidence that the accused was the one to approach her to solicit sex, while 
she was at work, this would not demonstrate an abuse of his position.173) 
165. Ibid.
166. Ibid at para 67. 
167. Long, supra note 159 at para 45.
168. Ibid at para 43.
169. R v Lutoslawski, 2010 ONCA 207 (aff’d 2010 SCC 49) at para 12 [Lutoslawski]. 
170. Ibid citing with approval R v Makayak, 2004 NUCJ 5 (Nun CJ) at para 70.
171. Snelgrove, supra note 160 at para 24.
172. Lutoslawski, supra note 169 at para 12.
173. Buenacruz, supra note 53 at para 67.
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The accused told her to attend the parking lot behind the shopping mall 
the following day. Again, the threshold is not high. It requires evidence 
of subtle pressure. Judge Pelletier’s conclusion that Buenacruz had not 
abused the power dynamic in this relationship did not appear to place any 
weight on these facts. 
Even more problematic, in concluding that Buenacruz had not abused 
his authority Judge Pelletier suggested that even if he had ordered her to 
attend the parking lot the test would not have been satisfied:
nevertheless…in my view, an order by a superior to attend at a given 
place and time with a view to provide sexual favours would be unlawful, 
hence non-enforceable in law….[S]uch an order would be manifestly 
unlawful, hence could be ignored. In fact, if such an order was obeyed, it 
could expose the subordinate to sanctions…These are basic propositions 
of military law. There are very few members of the CAF who would 
consider an order such as this one to require obedience, the same way 
as there are very few members of the CAF who would consider that 
they have no option but to comply with a demand of that kind that is not 
formulated as an order.174
There are at least two significant failings in this part of Judge Pelletier’s 
reasoning. First, the logical implication of his analysis is that consent will 
never be vitiated in circumstances in which a junior woman in the military 
is ordered to perform a sexual act by her superior. According to him, if a 
directive of this nature is issued as an order it is an unlawful one and she 
should know, as a member of the CAF, not to follow it and that she may 
face sanctions if she does comply. Conversely, if a directive of this nature 
is not formulated as an order she should know, as a member of the CAF, 
that she has the option not to follow it. The logic of blame reflected in this 
type of reasoning echoes the paradox for women posed by rape myths 
about consent: women who genuinely do not want to be raped will fight 
their attacker off; women who fail to successfully fight their attacker off 
actually ‘wanted it.’ Either way, in both lines of reasoning, women bear 
responsibility for the sexual contact that occurred.
The second difficulty is that, like his decision in R v Obele Ngoudni, 
underpinning Judge Pelletier’s reasoning are assumptions about Canadian 
military culture that are empirically unsound. For example, on what basis 
does he assert that “very few members of the CAF” would feel they have 
no option but to comply with a sexual demand or order by their superior? 
The 2016 Statistics Canada report on sexual misconduct in the CAF found 
that “half (49 per cent) of women who were victims of sexual assault in 
174. Ibid at para 73.
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the past 12 months identified their supervisor or someone of a higher rank 
as the perpetrator.”175 Nearly half of the 26 per cent of women members of 
the Regular Force who reported being the target of sexualized behaviour 
(the majority of which was perpetrated against them by members who 
were their supervisors or higher in rank) in the previous year indicated 
that this experience made them fearful.176 In the 2018 survey 130 women 
members of the Regular Force reported having been sexually assaulted by a 
supervisor or someone of a higher rank.177 In the course of her consultations 
Madame Deschamps received “numerous comments about dubious 
relationships between members of different rank in which participants 
questioned whether the lower ranking (usually female) member had been 
induced into the relationship, or where consent was not truly genuine.”178 
Her report also highlighted research indicating that the hierarchical nature 
of military culture and the emphasis “on values of obedience, conformity 
and respect for superiors” creates the circumstances in which abuses of 
power flourish.179 Judge Pelletier’s unsupported assertion that very few 
members of the CAF would feel they need to comply with a sexual demand 
or solicitation issued by their superior was speculative and is inconsistent 
with the research and data that is available. 
This consideration of the Canadian military’s sexual assault trial 
decisions, which is the first of its kind, is preliminary and part of a broader 
initial examination of the CAF’s legal system in the context of sexual 
assault cases. Given the small number of trials that have been conducted 
in the past four years, and the fact that all nine of the acquittals since 
Operation Honour occurred in trials presided over by only two judges, 
it would be premature to draw definitive conclusions about this body of 
caselaw. Instead this first look at these trial decisions should be understood 
as compelling evidence of the need for further inquiry and research. As 
suggested in the concluding section to follow, this study may raise more 
questions than it answers.
175. Statistics Canada, 2016, supra note 1 at 5.
176. Ibid at 35.
177. Statistics Canada, 2018, supra note 1 at 15 (this was a decline from 2016 when the percentage 
was 52%).
178. Deschamps Report, supra note 2 at 18. Deschamps did report that members were less likely 
to report incidents of quid pro quo harassment than they were to suggest negative impacts as a 
consequence of the overall culture of sexism in the CAF (ibid at 16). 
179. Ibid at 19 citing LM Cortina & JL Bergdahl, “Sexual Harassment in Organizations, A decade of 
Research in Review” in Stewart R Clegg & Cary L Cooper, eds, The Sage Handbook of Organizational 
Behaviour (London: Sage Publications, 2008) 469 at 474; Helena Carreiras, Gender and the Military 
Women in the Armed Forces of Western Democracies (London: Routledge, 2006) at 53; CM Hunt et 
al, “Reviewing sexual harassment in the workplace—an intervention model” (2010) 39:5 Personnel 
Review 655 at 659.
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Conclusion
Contrary to former Judge Advocate General Major-General Blaise 
Cathcart’s assertion, the courts martial system and civilian criminal courts 
in Canada are not “exactly the same” in terms of resources, standards and 
personnel.180 For example, the Auditor General’s 2018 assessment of the 
courts martial system concluded that because of their system of frequent 
rotation, military prosecutors and defence counsel do not develop the 
necessary expertise and experience to effectively perform their duties.181 
The rate of conviction for sexual assault through courts martial proceedings 
is dramatically lower than in the civilian system. The nature and outcome 
of plea bargaining in the military system differs in important ways from the 
civilian system. As explained, the vast majority of plea bargains in military 
sexual assault cases do not result in a Criminal Code conviction or SOIRA 
order and do result in remedies, such as reprimands and the equivalent of 
job demotions, that are unknown in the civilian system. The pool of judges 
available to preside over sexual assault cases is substantially smaller in 
the military legal system. Four judges have presided over all of the sexual 
assault trials conducted by the military since 2015. As noted, the same two 
judges presided over the nine trials that resulted in acquittals and were 
also the presiding judges in many of the cases involving plea bargains and 
subsequent sentencing decisions issued in sexual assault cases during this 
period. The variety of perspectives and collegial learning and informal 
checks and balances that may be facilitated when there is diversity within 
the membership of a particular court may be less likely to occur in a 
court with only four judges. The type of ‘cross-pollination’ more likely to 
occur on more diverse benches might be particularly important in the area 
of sexual assault law given the role that entrenched social assumptions 
about women and gender have historically played in the adjudication of 
these cases. The unique cultural and institutional context in which the 
military legal system operates also suggests a need for further research. 
To summarize, there are indeed important differences between the military 
legal system’s response to sexual assault and the civilian criminal legal 
system in Canada. These differences and their impacts on the prosecution 
and adjudication of sexual assault in particular have not been adequately 
studied. 
The military’s jurisdiction to prosecute sexual assault cases is currently 
under consideration. The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R v 
Beaudry will determine whether it is constitutional to prosecute individuals 
180. Testimony of Cathcart, supra note 41.
181. Report 3, supra note 16.
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for the offence of sexual assault through the courts martial system.182 If the 
Court upholds the military’s jurisdiction over sexual assault or if changes 
to the courts martial system to make it Charter compliant in response to a 
ruling in Beaudry are made so that the military can maintain jurisdiction 
of sexual assault, a number of further research questions, answers to which 
have not been provided in this preliminary study, should be examined. 
For example, what objectives informed the decision to grant the 
courts martial system the authority to address sexual assault cases and 
are those objectives being achieved? What proportion of sexual assault 
cases are referred to the civilian system and on what basis? Do many CAF 
survivors request that their cases be transferred to the civilian system and, 
if so, are their requests being granted? Given military culture and the 
institutional setting in which these cases arise, does character evidence 
play a different role in sexual assault trials by courts martial than in the 
civilian system? Criminal Code provisions such as those creating rules 
regarding a complainant’s medical or counselling records, evidence of 
other sexual activity, for complainants do not specifically apply in courts 
martial proceedings.183 Why aren’t these protections explicitly included in 
the courts martial legal process and what, if any, impact does this have on 
complainants? Are military judges exercising discretionary authority to 
enforce these statutory protections for complainants or are sexual assault 
complainants in military proceedings less likely to benefit from the legal 
regime created to protect them in the civilian criminal system? Put more 
broadly, regardless of the outcome in Beaudry, should the Canadian 
military’s legal system continue to maintain jurisdiction over sexual 
assault cases? 
182. If the Supreme Court of Canada upholds the decision of the Court Martial Appeal Court in 
Beaudry, supra note 10, the military’s current legal system will lose jurisdiction over any criminal 
offence that exposes accused individuals to the possibility of a sentence of incarceration of more than 
five years.
183. If Bill C-77, supra note 69 passes, these protections will be available in military sexual assault 
trials.
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